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Abstract
The main goal of this investigation is to understand the relationship between the nominal rate and 
the effective tax rate and to evaluate if the differences between them depend on the value of the nominal 
rate. Based on a sample of 1,530 companies from 5 countries members of the European Union (Denmark, 
Slovenia, Finland, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom) there’s evidence that the effective tax rate is 
positively related to the nominal rate. The effective tax rate was calculated through the ratio between the 
value of the tax paid over the result before tax. When the nominal tax rate increases, the effective rate 
increases equally but with a slower growth. This relationship is softened if we take into account the value 
of the nominal tax rate, which shows that companies have the ability to manage the results in order to 
increase savings in tax.
JEL classification: H25, H22, H20
Keywords: Nominal tax rate, Effective tax rate, Income tax, Tax management.
Resumen
El objetivo principal de esta investigación es comprender la relación entre la tasa nominal y la tasa 
efectiva de impuestos y evaluar si las diferencias entre ellos dependen del valor de la tasa nominal. Con 
base en una muestra de 1.530 empresas de 5 países miembros de la Unión Europea (Dinamarca, Eslove-
nia, Finlandia, Luxemburgo y el Reino Unido), hay evidencia de que la tasa efectiva de impuestos está 
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relacionada positivamente con la tasa nominal. La tasa efectiva de impuestos se calculó a través de la 
relación entre el valor del impuesto pagado sobre el resultado antes de impuestos. Cuando aumenta la tasa 
impositiva nominal, la tasa efectiva aumenta igualmente, pero con un crecimiento más lento. Esta relación 
se suaviza si tenemos en cuenta el valor de la tasa impositiva nominal, que muestra que las empresas tie-
nen la capacidad de administrar los resultados para aumentar los ahorros en impuestos.
Códigos JEL: H25, H22, H20
Palabras Clave: Tasa impositiva nominal, Tasa impositiva efectiva, Impuesto sobre la renta, Gestión tributaria
Introduction 
Several studies have shown that not only the nominal tax rate but also the effective tax 
rate over the profit of companies has been decreasing over the years. This has happened due to 
factors such as globalisation, tax competition between States or as a simple internal tax strategy 
of each country (Kawano e Slemrod, 2016; Slemrod, 2004; Mutti, 2003; Bretschger e Hettich, 
2002). However, it is important to study if the variations in the nominal tax rate have similar 
effects on corporate taxation or whether they can smooth out this impact, possibly using fiscal 
management practices.
The differences between the accountability rules and the tax rules imposed to the companies 
lead to a gap between the accounting result and the taxable profit, which can be calculated by 
the analysis of its effective tax rate when compared to the legal nominal rate.
Due to lack of literature which relates the effective tax rate to the nominal tax rate, the goal 
of the present study essentially deals with analysing this relationship and understanding the 
behaviour of the effective tax rate once there are nominal tax rate changes.
The sample for this study was selected through Bureau van Dijk’s Amadeus database. The 
choice of the countries was done according to the methodology of Watrin, et al. (2014), and all 
the countries where the IFRS was implemented in a similar way were selected. The companies 
had the option to use them or not. Afterwards the companies of the countries in which the 
nominal rate hasn’t changed for three years (the years in which the study took place, from 
2012 to 2014) were excluded. The final sample had a total of 1530 companies of 5 different 
countries, Denmark, Slovenia, Finland, Luxemburg and the United Kingdom.
It was created a model based on the study of Adhikari et al. (2006), in order to study the 
relationship between the effective tax rate and the nominal rate. This model is composed by the 
effective tax rate as a dependent variable, the nominal tax rate as the main independent variable 
and four control variables: the dimension of the company, the leverage, capital intensity and 
the return on assets.
According to the results obtained, evidence was found for the existence of a positive 
relationship between the effective tax rate and the nominal rate, even if there was a coefficient 
inferior to one, which demonstrates that the companies have the ability to manage their results 
in order to be able to pay less tax.
Literature review 
The Constitution of the Portuguese Republic clarifies us about the main objective of taxes: 
“The taxation system intends to satisfy the financial needs of the State and other public entities 
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and a fair separation of the incomes and the wealth (article 103th, nr.1). Through taxes the State 
obtains the necessary means to satisfy the collective needs of the population. As it is not the 
only type of public revenue, the tax on the income of corporate entities becomes very important 
to the pillar of the financial activity of the State. This tax is calculated upon the application of a 
nominal rate to the tax base which is found according to the tax rules of each country, and they 
assume some corrections to the value determined by accounting. It is only natural that through 
the years the behaviour and characteristics of the nominal rate have been studied by several 
investigators, who are aware that the State has the power to change it according to the needs of 
revenue and its taxation strategy (Hanlon e Heitzman 2010).
Nominal rate 
According to Slemrod and Bakija (2017), the nominal tax rate is legally defined and applied 
to the taxable income allows to determine the tax collection. When Bretschger e Hettich (2002) 
studied the main factors which influenced the nominal rate of 14 OECD (Organisation for 
the Economic Cooperation Development) between 1967 and 1996, they concluded that there 
was a tendency for the tax rate to decrease. This could be one of the possible consequences 
of globalisation and according to what was foreseen by different theoretical models of tax 
competition. Kawano and Slemrod (2016) have also achieved evidence that countries seek to 
propose legal policies to decrease their tax rates and increase their companies’ taxable income. 
In their study they have created a database with several features of the tax result of the companies 
which belong to OECD countries between 1980 and 2004. Their conclusions state that there is 
a positive relationship (even if it is narrow) between the tax rates and the tax revenues of the 
companies. Mutti (2003) investigated the crucial factors of the changes of the tax rates between 
60 countries in 1984, 1992 and 1996, and suggests that smaller countries, which are more 
open to external relationships, have greater tendency to reduce their tax rate over the years 
when compared to other countries. Devereux et al. (2008) investigated the tax competition of 
OECD countries on taxes levels over the companies and if that competition can explain the fall 
of tax rates between 1980 and 1990. Evidence suggests that the countries compete amongst 
themselves and the strategic interaction is present only in open economies, which foretells 
that decreasing tax rates can be almost fully explained by a more intense competition between 
countries. 
The decrease of institutional barriers to international investment rendered the tax differences 
between international and national companies more significant (Devereux et al., 2008), not 
only because this result may be achieved by international coordination and articulation of the 
tax rates, but only because tax competition spontaneously decreases tax differences between 
international companies and Simmons (2006) also found evidence of this. As one of the goals of 
the countries’ tax strategy is perhaps attracting foreign investment to increase the tax revenues 
(Clausing, 2007), and once there is a tendency of countries to decrease the tax rate, several 
authors investigated the relationship between the nominal tax rate and foreign investment. 
Alena et al. (2017) confirmed “that between countries there are still significant differences in 
the level of nominal and effective corporate tax burden, especially among a group of old and 
new EU Member States.” Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2000) concluded that foreign investment is 
sensitive to differences in tax rates. When Gropp e Kostial (2000) investigated the relationship 
between these two components, they proved that the investment is significantly affected by 
the tax system not only from the country from where the flow comes from, but also from the 
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country which is the receptor of the investment. Besides, Gropp and Kostial (2000) concluded 
that the taxable base is affected by the level of investment, in their study on foreign investment 
and taxable base. These results are consistent with the results of Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2000), 
once this effect is statistically more significant in countries where foreign investment is tax free.
Thus, the value of the income of each State is not only dependent on the value of the 
nominal tax rate but also on the “quality” of tax laws, on tax management opportunities, on 
companies’ tax aggressiveness, on the effort tax authorities apply to guarantee the tax laws 
are abided and the economic conditions that determine the companies’ rentability (Clausing, 
2007). Smaller countries, with more open economies, will seek lower income maximisation 
rates and even smaller companies can respond to tax rates variations, increasing the efforts of 
tax management or even tax evasion. Clausing (2007) stated that changing the nominal rate 
may not correspond to a proportional changing of the tax value, and thus it is necessary to 
analyse the effective tax rate as well. Slemrod (2004) studied the variation of the nominal tax 
rate in 90 countries throughout 4 years (1980, 1985, 1990 and 1995), and verified that both the 
nominal rate and the effective rate have a decreasing tendency.
However, Castro and Camarillo (2014), analysing the determinants on tax revenue, 
concluded that the tax gap, measured by the difference between tax capacity and tax revenue, 
tends to remain stable over time across the 34 countries from the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, over the period between 2001–2011, included in their sample. 
Castro and Camarillo (2014) suggested that this was due to the fact that the characteristics 
of the taxation systems of these economies have not significantly changed along the period 
analysed. 
Effective tax rate
The effective rate is a regular measure to calculate the tax volume of companies, evaluate 
tax planning efficacy (Li et al., 2016; Watson, 2015; Phillips et al., 2004) and trace tax evasion 
practices (Kafkalas et al., 2014; Chiarini et al., 2013; Markle and Shackelford, 2011; Rego, 
2003). Once it is the percentage of the profits the companies effectively deliver the State, it 
could be well defined as the ratio between the total of tax income and the tax base from which 
they came from, differing from the nominal rate mainly because the tax laws are different 
from the accountant rules. This leads us to a discrepancy between the taxable profit and the 
accountant profit. For this reason it is only natural that literature has devoted so much in this 
area.
Dyreng et al. (2014) have investigated the evolution of effective tax rates in the United 
States of America (USA) for 25 years, and observed an annual average decrease of the ETR 
(Effective Tax Rate) in 0, 4 percentage points which represents a grand total of 10 percentage 
points during the period of time studied. Loretz (2007) got evidence that smaller countries 
present a lower effective tax rate, though he concludes bigger countries are more likely to 
reduce their tax volume through bilateral tax agreements. Wang et al. (2014) aimed to study 
tax rates on incidents over companies rated in China between 2007 and 2011 and analysed 
the factors which influenced the effective tax rate with or without foreign investment. Their 
conclusion was that industry, leverage, size and the fact whether they are held by the State or 
not, are factors which significantly influence the effective tax rate. Rego (2003) concluded that 
multinational companies with wider foreign operations present a lower ETR. Likewise, Dyreng 
et al. (2014) found that the ETR decreased in a stronger way in multinational companies than 
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in domestic companies. Several studies also investigated the relationship between the ETR 
and the size of the company, obtaining conflicted results depending on the way we calculate 
the ETR, the focussed period of time and the model used (Phillips et al. 2004; Shackelford 
and Shevlin 2001). Katsikas and Lewis (2016) have proven that, in the companies analysed, 
the size of the company affects the values of the effective tax rates, whereas Belz et al. (2015) 
demonstrated that larger companies have a superior ETR over smaller companies. Earlier Gupta 
and Newberry (1997) stated that the size of the company is not directly associated with the 
effective tax rate, and found evidence that a lower ETR is associated with a lower profitability, a 
larger leverage and a stronger capital intensity. Powers et al. (2016) claimed that the companies 
which use cash flows as indicators to pay bonus, present lower ETR than the companies which 
use rentability indicators. Besides, the companies which evaluate their CEO’s (Chief executive 
Office’s) performance through indicators related to the result after taxes have similar ETR when 
compared with those, which use indicators such as the result before taxes. Yet, they assume 
different options towards financial reports. Powers et al. (2016) examined different measures to 
evaluate in which way the manager’s performance towards obtaining annual bonus influences 
tax management. This topic is relevant because it could be one of the reasons which influences 
the difference between the effective rate and the nominal tax rate.
Tax management 
Tax management is the result of a number of activities and legal procedures which aim to 
minimise expenses with taxes, such as investments in tax free assets or maximising tax benefits. 
These activities may sometimes be too aggressive, harming the State or even violate the law, 
leading to tax evasion phenonena. 
Rego and Wilson (2009) and Bankman (1998) stated that practising an aggressive tax 
management compensates companies because the prospect of tax authorities detecting any 
illegal procedure is low. Chen and Chu (2005) and Slemrod (2004) suggested that managers 
and shareholders agree the level of tax management to uphold. Graham and Tucker (2006) 
concluded that companies which practice tax management improve their credit ratings than 
those which don’t, so the authors supported that tax management should influence the price of 
shares, once it can reduce bankruptcy costs, improve credit quality and decrease cost of debt. 
Desai and Dharmapala (2009) also found a positive relationship between tax management and 
the value of American companies. Armstrong et al. (2011) concluded that there is a strong 
negative relationship between the incentives to the company’s manager and effective tax rates, 
which means that the more the incentive, the less the effective tax rate. Desai and Dharmapala 
(2006), analysed the impact of incentives on managers and on the culture of the company, 
and they concluded that both are significantly strong on effective tax rates, though they aren’t 
sure incentives affect the company’s tax planning, once changes on the effective tax burden of 
the company may happen because of involuntary actions from the managers. Badertscher et 
al. (2009) demonstrated that private capital companies increase the efficiency of tax planning 
where there is investment even after its decrease of capital or capital outflow from those 
companies. Some researchers suggest that with a major compliance between the tax system 
and the accounting system, tax aggressiveness and abusive tax management will significantly 
decrease, thus improving earnings quality and tax compliance (Desai, 2005). On the other 
hand, other researchers arguing that the relevant financial information necessary to financial 
demonstrations is considerably different from the information asked by the tax authorities. 
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They believe an increase on compliance between accounting result and tax result will decrease 
profit quality (Hanlon et al., 2008; Hanlon and Shevlin, 2004). When Lennox et al. (2013), 
studied the relationship between quality of the financial information and possible fraud 
indicators, they claim that companies which practice an aggressive tax deferral are less likely 
to manipulate their financial demonstrations in a fraudulent way. Frank et al. (2009) developed 
a measure for aggressive tax deferral which allows tax management detection. Recent studies 
demonstrated that companies which practice tax management are more profitable, have wider 
foreign operations, subsidiaries in tax havens, spend more with investigation and development 
and are less indebted. (Badertscher et al., 2009; Graham and Tucker, 2006; Lennox et al., 
2013).
Objectives, hypothesis and methodology
The main goal of this investigation is to understand the relationship between the nominal 
rate and the effective tax rate and to evaluate if the differences between them depend on the 
value of the nominal rate. Through the studied models we will also be able to understand 
whether the differences between the rates sharpen or reduce, depending on the size of the 
company, the capital investment, the leverage and the return on assets.
According to existent literature, ETR variation may be partially explained and connected to 
several characteristics of companies such as the shareholder framework (Badertscher et al. 2016; 
Chen et al. 2010), the managers’ incentives (Rego and Wilson 2012; Armstrong et al., 2011), 
corporate and government structure (Desai et al., 2007), the characteristics of business (Higgins 
et al., 2015), the companies’ size (Katsikas and Lewis, 2016; Belz et al., 2015; Richardson and 
Lanis, 2007) and managers’ characteristics (Chyz et al., 2013). Nevertheless, few studies have 
been conducted towards analysing the behaviour of effective tax analysis (Guenther, 2014) and 
its dependence on nominal rate, which makes the effective tax rate expected to be as high as the 
nominal tax rate. These statements lead to the following research hypothesis:
H1: There is a positive relationship between the effective tax rate and the nominal rate.
Several authors suggest that a tax system is not efficient once the gap between nominal 
and effective tax rates is high (Gravelle, 2013; Dyreng, et al., 2008), because when the State 
defines a tax rate, they should want to obtain a revenue equivalent to the nominal rate applied 
to companies’ incomes, which doesn’t happen very often. Some companies have the ability 
to reach a big difference between a high nominal tax rate and a low effective tax rate, thus 
resulting in an uneven tax system whose consequences are everything but desirable (Gravelle, 
2013; Dyreng, et al., 2008). This can lead to results which are contrary to the first hypothesis, 
assuming that the higher the nominal rate, the stronger the effort of the companies to maximise 
savings into tax, so they will have lower effective rates. This leads us to the following second 
research hypothesis:
H2: The positive relationship between the effective tax rate and the nominal rate is reduced 
when the nominal rate is higher, once compared with when the nominal rate is lower.
With the goal to study the relationship between the nominal tax rate and the effective 
rate, we used a model which proves the relationship between the two rates and calculated the 
necessary variables for it.
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Dependent variable – Effective Tax Rate
In the present study we used the traditional ETR calculating formula which was determined 
through the ratio between the value of the tax paid over the result before the i company’s tax in 
year t (Hoi et al., 2013; Rego and Wilson, 2012)2 and following Watrin et al. (2014) or Graham 
et al. (2017)many companies use an average tax rate (the GAAP effective tax rate, ETR who 
also used Amadeus database in their studies: 
In which:
= effective tax rate of the company i in year t;
     = total tax amount (current and deferred) of the company i in year t;
 = result before tax of the company i in year t;
Main independent variable – Nominal Tax Rate
In the present study we used the maximum nominal rates of each country provided by the 
European Commission in its annual Eurostat report from 20153, where all maximum nominal 
rates from each country are described, including surcharges. 
Control variables
Several previous studies demonstrated that the companies’ features are also related to 
ETR and can help to explain its variation. According to Adhikari et al. (2006) the size of the 
company (SIZE), the capital structure (LEV), the capital intensity (CAPINT) and profitability 
(ROA – Return On Assets) were used as control variables. These variables had already been 
previously related to and used with ETR by other authors (Kim and Limpaphayom, 1998; 
Gupta and Newberry, 1997; Spooner, 1986; Stickney and McGee, 1982). 
Derashid and Zhang, (2003), Kim and Limpaphayom, (1998) and Rego, (2003) demonstrated 
that the size of the company relates negatively with ETR, i.e., bigger companies have a lower 
effective tax rate. On the other hand, Belz et al., (2015) proved that ETR and the size of the 
company (SIZE) have a positive relationship. Though there are contradictory results from 
different authors, the relationship between SIZE and ETR is quite significant, and that is why 
it was included in the model. The variable SIZE was calculated through the natural logarithm 
of the asset.
Not only Gupta and Newberry (1997) but also Stickney and McGee (1982) reached the 
conclusion that the variable LEV and CAPINT are negatively related to ETR because of 
taxation deduction, of interest payments and of high expense with depreciations connected to 
2 “Special items” is a variable from the database Compustat which includes less frequent accounting events, for 
instance, write-offs of assets and adjustments from previous years.
3 European Commission Report - “Taxation trends in the European Union” Eurostat (2015) ISSN 2467-0073
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the lifetime of assets. The variable LEV was calculated by dividing the total debt by the total 
asset and CAPINT corresponds to the fixed asset ratio over the total asset4.
There was also included a variable related to the outcomes, variable ROA, which is 
represented by the ratio of the outcomes before taxes over the total asset. 
Thus, the model used in the present study is the following:
In which:
  = effective tax rate of the company i in year t;
  = nominal tax rate in the country k in year t;
  = size of the company i in year t;
  = leverage of the company i in year t;
  = capital intensity of the company i in year t;
  = profitability of the company i in year t;
In the next chapter the main results and conclusions will be presented according to the given 
model.
Data
In view of the link between the accounting and taxation has in this issue and allow an 
analysis of companies with similar characteristics to the accounting system, were selected 
the companies from all EU countries which were available in Bureau van Dijk’s Amadeus 
database, which has the application of IFRS as optional in individual financial demonstrations 
(Watrin et al., 2014) according to the most recent European Commission (2013)5, which we 
can check on Table 1.
4 The variable of the fixed assets is represented by the addition of the variables “Intangible fixed assets” “Tangible 
fixed assets” “Other fixed assets” of Amadeus database.
5Check http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/accounting/docs/legal_framework/20140718-ias-use-of-options_en.pdf 
[05.07.2016]
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Table 1
Application of IFRS in individual DF´s in the European Union member 
States (2013).
Mandatory Forbidden Optional
Bulgary Austria Denmark
Cyprus Germany Slovenia
Croatia Belgium Finland
Estonia Slovakia Ireland
Greece Spain Italy
Latvia France Luxembourg
Lituania Hungary Netherlands
Malta Romania Poland
Czech Republic Sweden Portugal
United Kingdom
Source: European Commission
From the universe of the 10 countries which obey the rule presented, those in which the 
nominal tax rate didn’t suffer changes between 2012 and 2014 were excluded. The reason for 
this was to check the effects a change in the nominal rate has in the effective tax rate. Thus, 
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Poland and Portugal were excluded. On Table 2 we can observe 
the steps for the sample selection. The choice of the period of time (2012 to 2014) was defined 
in a way that the most updated data of the companies available may be studied and during 
a period of time which minimises bias in the results. Since the financial sector has different 
characteristics from the rest, and companies from this sector aren’t being analysed in this 
research, all companies from this sector have been excluded from the sample.  According to 
the methodology of Adhikari et al. (2006) and Gupta and Newberry (1997), companies with 
lower ETR’s or equal to zero and over one have also been eliminated, because not only negative 
ETR’s but also the ones over 1 represent unusual cases which can cause bias to the results. 
Finally, when excluding outliers all companies which in each variable were outside the range 
of the average plus/minus twice the standard deviation were selected. We then reached a sample 
of 1530 companies from 5 countries: Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, Slovenia and the United 
Kingdom.
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Table 2
Selection of the Sample.
Procedures followed Number of companies
1. Selection of the companies of the 5 countries with available data1 90.162
2. Exclusion of the companies from the financial sector 32.884
4. Elimination of outliers 4.724
5. Elimination of the companies with ETR ≤ 0 e > 1 1.530
1 Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, Slovenia and the United Kingdom.
Source: Own Elaboration
On Table 3 we can observe that the least represented country in the sample is Luxembourg, 
with only 37 selected companies out of the 1530 total companies of the sample, which 
corresponds to 2.42% of the sample. On the other hand, the best represented country is the 
United Kingdom with 800 companies, which represents 52. 29% of the sample. Denmark is the 
second best represented country, with 25. 75% of the sample and 394 companies.
Table 3 
Distribution of the Companies by Country.
Country Number of Companies %
Denmark 394 25.75%
Slovenia 40 2.61%
Finland 259 16.93%
Luxembourg 37 2.42%
United Kingdom 800 52.29%
Total 1.530 100%
Source: Own Elaboration
Out of the countries of the sample, Slovenia is the country with the lowest nominal rate 
throughout the 3 years with an average rate of 17.33% during the analysed period of time, as 
opposing to Luxembourg which represents the highest rate of all 5 countries, with an average 
of 29.07% which can be seen on Table 4. The presented nominal rates represent the maximum 
rate from each country (including surcharges). 
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Table 4
Nominal tax rate by Country.
Country 2012 2013 2014 Average
Denmark 25.0% 25.0% 24.5% 24.83%
Slovenia 18.0% 17.0% 17.0% 17.33%
Finland 24.5% 24.5% 20.0% 23.00%
Luxembourg 28.8% 29.2% 29.2% 29.07%
United Kingdom 24.0% 23.0% 21.0% 22.67%
Source: European Commission - “Taxation trends in the European Union” Eurostat (2015) ISSN 2467-0073.
Results
On Table 5, we can analyse the evolution of the effective tax rate, the total asset, the results 
before tax (RAI), the paid tax and the sample’s companies’ net profit (RL). It is proven that, 
in general, the presented variables registered a growth with an exception of the effective rate, 
which presents a decrease throughout the 3 years.
Table 5
Averages of the Effective Rate, the Asset, the RAI, the Paid Tax and the RL.
YEARS Effective Rate1 Asset2 RAI2 Paid Tax2 RL2
2012 23.52 723.83 96.95 21.71 75.24
2013 23.50 839.06 112.00 24.85 87.16
2014 22.31 997.28 140.09 29.42 110.66
Total Average 23.11 853.39 116.35 25.32 91.02
1 Percentage values;
2 Values.in thousands of euros.
Source: Own Elaboration
The period under review, defined by the european economic upturn, also shows some 
recovery as far as companies profitability is concerned and as far as their greater tendency 
to invest, once the average value of the active increases approximately 270 thousand euros, 
keeping up with the ascendant movement registered not only in the net profit but also in RAI. 
Nevertheless, and as Dyreng et al., (2014) or Slemrod (2004) had already identified, we observe 
that the average ETR has significantly decreased in this period, which may result on the drop of 
the nominal rates of the majority of these countries presented on table 4.
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On Table 6, there is the descriptive statistics of each of the variables included in the model, 
the average, the median, the standard deviation, minimum and maximum. The dependent 
variable (ETR) presents an average of 23.1%, whilst in the nominal rate variable we can see 
that the lowest value is 17% and the maximums 29.2%, which corresponds to an average of 
23.3%. It is also visible that the average of the ETR, LEV and ROA variables are higher than 
the average of the sample variables of Adhikari et al. (2006).
Table 6
Descriptive statistics.
Variable Average Median Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
ETR 0.231 0.215 0.099 0.000 1.000
NTR 0.233 0.240 0.020 0.170 0.292
SIZE 2.273 2.187 0.806 0.227 3.929
LEV 0.193 0.000 0.993 0.000 34.360
CAPINT 0.238 0.110 0.283 -0.007 1.044
ROA 0.480 0.192 0.975 -16.432 10.595
ETR 
NTR 
SIZE 
LEV 
CAPINT 
ROA
Effective Tax Rate – Ration between the paid tax and the result before tax 
Nominal Tax Rate 
Size – Natural logarithm of the asset  
Leverage – ratio between the financial indebtedness and the total asset 
Capital Intensity – ratio between the fixed asset and the total asset 
Return On Assets – ration between the result before tax and the total asset
Source: Own Elaboration
On Table 7 there are the Pearson correlation coefficients of the variables of the studied 
model to test for multicollinearity. We can see there is no strong relationship between each 
variable of the model, which is reason enough to include them all. Except for the correlation 
between ROA and SIZE (correlation coefficient = −0.428), the correlations between all other 
independent variables are less than 0.30, indicating that multicollinearity is not a problem in 
our regression analysis.
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Table 7
Correlation matrix.
 ETR NTR SIZE LEV CAPINT ROA
ETR 1.000
NTR 0.162** 1.000
SIZE 0.070** 0.052** 1.000
LEV -0.030* -0.009 0.111** 1.000
CAPINT 0.071** 0.073** 0.200** 0.193** 1.000
ROA
-0.107** -0.110** -0.428** -0.291** -0.205** 1.000
ETR Effective Tax Rate – Ration between the paid tax and the result before tax
NTR Nominal Tax Rate
SIZE Size – Natural logarithm of the asset
LEV Leverage – ratio between the financial indebtedness and the total asset
CAPINT Capital Intensity – ratio between the fixed asset and the total asset
ROA  Return On Assets – ration between the result before tax and the total asset
*,** statistically significant to a level of significancy of 0.05 and 0.01, respectively.
Source: Own Elaboration
Model of Linear Regression (Results) 
As previously mentioned in the development of the hypothesis, it is estimated that the 
bigger the nominal rate is, the higher the effective tax rate, thus establishing a positive 
relationship between both rates in order that it validates Hypothesis 1. 
On Table 8 there are the results of the predictive model of regression, and it was used 
the method of estimation of the ordinary squared minimums to estimate the corresponding 
parameters.
Except for the coefficient variable SIZE, the other coefficients are statistically significant 
to a level of significancy of 0. 01. There were not detected any multicollinearity problems 
between every explanatory variables included in the model, once the value of VIF (Variance 
Inflation Factor) is always lower than 2.
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Table 8
Relationship between the Effective Tax Rate and the Nominal Tax Rate.
Independent variables Explanatory signal Coefficient t
Constant ? 0.0613*** 3.552
NTR + 0.7110*** 10.06
SIZE +/- 0.0025 1.27
LEV - -0.0067*** -4.42
CAPINT - 0.0174*** 3.31
ROA ? -0.0093*** -5.46
Adj. R2 0.040
N=4.590 
  
ETR          Effective Tax Rate – Ration between the paid tax and the result before tax
NTR          Nominal Tax Rate
SIZE         Size – Natural logarithm of the asset 
LEV          Leverage – ratio between the financial indebtedness and the total asset
CAPINT   Capital Intensity – ratio between the fixed asset and the total asset
ROA         Return On Assets – ration between the result before tax and the total asset
*,**,*** statistically significant to a level of significancy of 0.1, 0.05 e 0.01, respectively.
Source: Own Elaboration
The results are evidence of a positive relationship between the effective tax rate and the 
nominal rate, confirming the Hypothesis 1. The positive relationship between the two variables 
demonstrate that, on average, when the nominal rate increases one percentage point, the 
effective rate only increases 0.71 percentage points, which could mean that companies have the 
capability to manage their results, decreasing the amount of paid tax.
The companies with a higher leverage and a lower return on asset (ROA) really pay less tax. 
These results confirm the study of Adhikari et al. (2006). The negative relationship between the 
variable LEV and ETR may probably be explained through the interest payment which is tax 
deductible due to a higher leverage (Gupta and Newberry, 1997; Stickney and McGee, 1982).
In the Hypothesis 2 it is tested if when the nominal rate increases the companies have more 
tendency to decrease the paid tax, thus alleviating the positive relationship between ETR and 
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NTR. In order to answer that research question (H2) a second model was created where two 
variables were added. A Dummy variable, which is equal to 1 when the nominal rate applied by 
that company is over the average of nominal rates of that year and equal to 0 when the nominal 
rate of the company is less than the sample average in that year, and the Dummy NTR variable 
comes from the product between the Dummy variable and the nominal tax rate (NTR).
This way, the model used in this study for H2 is as follows:
In which:
 = effective tax rate of the company i in year t;
 = nominal tax rate of the country k in year t;
 = size of the company i in year t;
 = leverage of the company i in year t;
 = capital intensity of the company i in year t;
 = profitability of the company i in year t;
 = 1 when the nominal tax rate of the company i is higher than the average 
nominal rate of the sample in year t;
 = product between the Dummy variable and the nominal rate of the country k 
in year t;
On Table 9 we can analyse the changes of the results of the regression when introducing 
the two new variables. As estimated, the relationship between ETR and NTR was softened by 
introducing the two new variables, maintaining however the positive relationship.  This result 
confirms the second research hypothesis.
The fact that NTR coefficient lowered is evidence that, when the nominal rate increases 
1 percentage point, the effective rate increases an average of only 0.31 percentage point and 
not 0,71 of the model of the hypothesis 1. This result confirms the conclusions of Dyreng, et 
al. (2008) and Gravelle (2013)”ISSN” : “0001-4826”, “abstract” : “We develop and describe 
a new measure of long\u2010run corporate tax avoidance that is based on the ability to pay a 
low amount of cash taxes per dollar of pre\u2010tax earnings over long time periods. We label 
this measure the \u201clong\u2010run cash effective tax rate.\u201d We use the long\u2010run 
cash effective tax rate to examine (1 that the higher the nominal tax rate, the higher the effort 
of the companies to decrease the value of the tax to pay.
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Table 9
The relationship between the effective rate and the nominal tax rate 
(influence of the value off the nominal tax rate).
Independent variables Estimated signal ETR t
Constant ? 0.1339*** 5.75
NTR + 0.3148*** 3.05
SIZE +/- 0.0048** 2.44
LEV - -0.0047*** -3.10
CAPINT - 0.0059 1.11
ROA ? -0.0038** -2.18
Dummy ? 0.3973*** 6.49
DummyNTR + -1.443*** -6.22
Adj. R2 0.071
N=52.248
   
ETR             Effective Tax Rate – Ration between the paid tax and the result before tax
NTR             Nominal Tax Rate
SIZE            Size – Natural logarithm of the asset 
LEV             Leverage – ratio between the financial indebtedness and the total asset
CAPINT      Capital Intensity – ratio between the fixed asset and the total asset
ROA            Return On Assets – ration between the result before tax and the total asset
Dummy        is equal to 1 when the nominal rate of the company i is higher than the average nominal rate of the sample 
in year t
DummyNTR product between the Dummy variable and the nominal rate of the country k in year t;
*,**,*** statistically significant to a level of significancy of 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively.
Source: Own elaboration
All variables included in this new model are statistically significant to a level of significancy 
of 0, 01, except for the variables SIZE, CAPINT and ROA. The variable CAPINT is not 
statistically significant to any of the levels of significancy, SIZE and ROA are statistically 
significant to a level of significancy of 0. 05. The control variables approximately present the 
same coefficient than in the first model, which indicates stability in the results. There were 
also not detected problems of multicollinearity between the explanatory variables included in 
the model.
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With this model we conclude that the increase of the nominal rate influences the difference 
between the effective tax rate and the nominal rate and the effort of the companies in practising 
tax management, thus increasing tax saving.
Conclusion and discussion
In general, the present study had the goal to investigate the relationship between the effective 
rate and the nominal tax rate over the income of corporate entities. The sample for this study 
was selected from Bureau van Dijk’s Amadeus database. In order to study the relationship 
between the rates, companies from 5 countries were selected: Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, 
Slovenia and the United Kingdom.  The choice of the countries followed the method of Watrin 
et al. (2014), in which all the countries using IFRS which followed them in a similar way were 
selected, keeping as optional the choice of the accounting system for the individual accounts of 
each company and that, in the 3 years studied, registered changes in the nominal rate.
When determining the effective tax rate, a calculation formula was used as it had been done 
by several authors such as Graham et al. (2017), Watrin et al. (2014), Hoi et al. (2013) and 
Rego and Wilson (2012), by dividing the total tax by the result before tax. 
In order to relate with the effective tax rate, the maximum nominal rate of each country was 
used according to the European Commission. There were still control variables used, such as 
the size of the company (SIZE), the capital structure (LEV), the capital intensity (CAPINT) and 
a profitability variable (ROA – Return On Assets). These variables were used by Adhikari et al. 
(2006), following the studies of Gupta and Newberry, (1997) and Stickney and McGee (1982).
After the study of the model, the results indicate, as previously estimated, that there is 
a positive relationship between the effective rate and the nominal tax rate. This leads us to 
conclude that, on average, when the nominal tax rate increases, the effective rate also increases.
The results also show that the effective rate increases less than the nominal tax rate, which 
confirms the conclusions of previous studies where companies have the ability to decrease the 
total tax to pay through tax management.
Notwithstanding the average of the ETR and NTR be approximately the same, the median 
between these two variables may betray that not all companies can minimise their invoice in 
the same way, which paves the way for the study of its tax management.
It was also possible to check that the larger companies, perhaps more enabled to develop an 
efficient tax management, are related to larger ETR, such as it had been previously proven by 
Belz et al. (2015) in contradiction with what had been observed by Gupta and Newberry (1997). 
By the same token we can explain the fact that companies with larger ROA present decreasing 
ETR, which proves the studies of Badertscher et al. (2009), Graham and Tucker (2006) and 
Lennox et al. (2013) who demonstrated that the companies which practise tax management are 
the most profitable than those which do not.
The second research issue was related to the tax management earlier mentioned, which 
was related to studying if with the increase of the nominal rate the companies will have more 
tendency to increase their efforts in decreasing the paid tax. Thus, it would be estimated that 
assuming the value of the nominal tax rate, the positive relationship between the nominal rate 
and the effective rate proven in the first model would be reduced.
This way, two variables were added to the model related to the value of the nominal rate. As it 
had been estimated, the relationship between the two rates remained positive, but with a weaker 
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relationship. We concluded that on average the companies have the ability to reach a beneficial 
difference between the effective rate and the nominal tax rate through tax management, and this 
conclusion is according to the results of Dyreng, et al. (2008) and Gravelle (2013).
It is then empirically demonstrated that, for the companies studied, the relationship between 
the effective rate and the nominal tax rate is positive, and this relationship is reduced once there 
is an increase of the nominal tax rate.
This way, the study contributes to the literature because it allows understanding that the 
companies have the ability to manage their results in order to save tax. In a macroeconomic 
outlook, with the increase of the nominal tax rate we get more revenue by increasing the 
nominal tax rate. Nevertheless, it is necessary to consider that the higher the nominal tax rate, 
the more companies wish to decrease the value of the tax to pay.
It is not to be faded into oblivion that some limitations are associated to the present study, 
mainly because the results proved little overall grip to the model. However, previous researches 
related to the effective tax rate also mostly show a weak grip to the model. Still, in this context, 
the fact that in the sample selected there are companies with lack of data in Amadeus is a 
limitation, which compels the exclusion of many companies, thus leading to different results if 
they were all included.
As suggestions to future research we suggest the research on the relationship between the 
effective rate and the nominal rate in the remaining European countries, increasing the time-
lapse and checking in which countries tax management is more frequent.
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